



FO 371/132787

1958

الحدود بين أبوظبي والسعودية في منطقة البريمي الصفحات المختارة

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تم إنشاؤه في: 06 أبريل 2021

الصفحات: الصفحات المختارة

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وصف الفهرس:

يتعلق الملف بالنزاع على البريمي، ويتضمن مراسلات تتعلق بالآتي:

- موقف سلطان مسقط وعمان سعيد بن تيمور من التحكيم بشأن البريمي (1)
- مقالة [مرفقة] في صحيفة *ذا ريبورتر*، بقلم بوشورد هاورد (2)
- محادثات بين وزير الخارجية ورئيس وزراء باكستان في أنقرة (3)
- استدعاء السفير السعودي في الولايات المتحدة إلى الرياض للتشاور، ومحادثاته مع جيه. إف. دالاس (4)
- محادثات دي. إم. إتش ريتشز مع إميل بستاني (5)
- محادثات بين وزير الشؤون الخارجية التركي فطين رشدي زورلو والسفير جيه. بوك (6)
- تبادل وجهات النظر بين السيد ريتشيز والسيد بورديت من وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية بشأن السعودية والبريمي، وطلب من السير هارولد كاسيا للحصول على معلومات عن المحادثات (7-8، 11-12، 15، 20، 25)
- اقتراح الولايات المتحدة إنشاء "منطقة محايدة" في البريمي وذلك في اجتماع عُقد بين كاسيا والسفير الأمريكي، رد بي. أيه. بي. بوروز بشأن المحادثات مع الأمريكيان، وخاصةً بي. أيه. بي. بوروز فيما يتعلق بدليل الاتفاق المبرم بين أبوظبي ومسقط والسعودية لمقاومة الرئيس جمال عبدالناصر، رئيس مصر. تعليقات بوروز على انسحاب قوة ساحل عُمان المتصالح، تعليقات أخرى من ريتشيز على الاتصالات بين السعودية وأبوظبي، وانسحاب قوة ساحل عُمان المتصالح، ومحادثات بين بوروز والشيخ عبدالله بن عيسى آل خليفة، عم حاكم البحرين، بشأن الوساطة بين السعودية وأبوظبي (9، 18، 24، 27)
- محادثات بين وزير الخارجية ودالاس في كوبنهاجن (10)
- مراجعة لوزير الخارجية بشأن مسارات العمل المحتملة بشأن البريمي، ورد بوروز على ريتشيز بأن وجود أي سلطة

سعودية في البريمي غير مرغوب فيه (13-14 ، 16-17)

- سؤال برلماني من عضو البرلمان فينر بروكواي إلى وزير الخارجية بشأن نزاع البريمي (19)
- تعليقات من القيادة المركزية للقوات البريطانية في شبه الجزيرة العربية بشأن التنازل عن البريمي بالضغط الأمريكي، بشرط إثبات تقديم السعودية للتنازلات أولاً (21)
- مذكرة من إي. إف. هندرسون عن الوضع في البريمي قبل عام 1952 (22)
- سؤال برلماني من جوزيف جريموند إلى وزير الخارجية عن الوضع الحالي في البريمي (26)
- احتمال أن الشيخ محمد بن عبدالله السالمي هو من قام بتأليف كتاب شعب عُمان، والذي يُعتقد أنه استند عليه موجز السعودية المعدّ للتحكيم (28)



1/ DMR
Y DML
3/ mK

AIR BAG
10525/18/58



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
FEBRUARY 13, 1958.

My dear Robert. [PA1081/4]
N/R

Will you please refer to Sir Pierson Dixon's letter No. G 1054/20/58 of February 6 to Harold Beeley about his latest conversation with Abdurrahman Azzam in New York.

2. Rockwell, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department, told me today that the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington had been recalled to Riyadh for consultations, and had requested a meeting with Mr. Dulles before he left. Mr. Dulles saw him on February 11.

3. Sheikh Khayyal asked Mr. Dulles if there was anything new about Buraimi. Mr. Dulles said that the subject had of course come up in his talks with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd at Ankara. He mentioned the proposal that a meeting should be arranged between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat, and urged that this be given further consideration. He said that he had heard that King Saud insisted that before he met the Sultan there must be prior agreement on Buraimi: but was it not possible to arrange a preliminary meeting at a lower level between some emissary of King Saud and the Sultan?

4. Sheikh Khayyal said that the efforts by the British Government to arrange a direct meeting between King Saud and the Sultan was a new element in the situation; in commenting on this proposal he made the usual assumption that the Sultan would do, and would only do, what the British Government told him. Mr. Dulles said that this was not his view: the Sultan was the master of his own policies. He agreed that the efforts of the British Government to bring about a meeting was a new element, which they had introduced in their desire to promote a settlement. He hoped the Saudi Government would take advantage of it.

5. There was also some discussion of the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, during which Mr. Dulles and the Ambassador reiterated their respective positions, without taking the subject any further.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Given in Bahrain.

Yours ever,
W. Morris.

W. Morris.

A.R. Walmsley, Esq., M.B.E.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

E

A1081/5

ARABIA

FROM

7.0. Minute by
D.M. H. Riches

No.

Dated

March 7.

Received in
Registry—

March 10.

Bahraini

Conversation with Siml Bustani: agreement
over Bahraini to be reached as in Bahrain/
Saudi oil sharing agreement.

1081

References to former relevant papers

PN 4/7

EA1051/7

(Print)

(How disposed of)

DHS in B. Burrows

Bahraini (over)

M. Riches March 12

cc) Kuwait

Doha

Dubai

Muscat

(Action
completed)

PS
14/4/58

(Index)

10/4/58

References to later relevant papers

MINUTES

We had a transcript of Mr.
Brown's interview in "At Home
and Abroad" after his return
from the trip. But I have
not been able to trace it again.

Can you help re?

Mr. L. 1/4

NI - perhaps it wasn't entered.

x

Mr. L. 1/4

- 7 MAR 1958

Minutes

BURAIMI

EA1081/5.

Emile Bustani spoke to me about this at lunch today.

2. After a few derogatory remarks about Mr. Sidney Cotton he said that we should ascertain from Mr. George Brown M.P. what had been said to him by King Saud and by the Ruler of Qatar during his tour of the Gulf in Mr. Bustani's company. He went on to say that everyone was very pleased about the Bahrain/Saudi oil sharing agreement and he was quite sure that Saud was honest and would oblige ARAMCO to prospect and drill in the oil sharing area at once. He said that this successful agreement pointed the need for an agreement over Buraimi and it could be done in much the same way by King Saud having the sovereignty of an area from which the oil proceeds would nevertheless be shared. I said that the lesson of the Bahrain agreement to me was, that we as trustees were bound to be less flexible in negotiation than our clients and therefore it was much the best plan for Saud to negotiate direct with the Sultan of Muscat. He replied that once a British envoy to Saud had indicated our agreement, that the matter could be settled on the basis above described Saud would no doubt be willing to receive the Sultan. I said that I saw no prospect of the Sultan agreeing to such a proposal. Mr. Bustani said that he knew the Sultan was very stubborn but he thought it would help if he visited him. He would have, however, to go with the blessing of the British Government.

3. Mr. Bustani then made the point that if we imagined that the Rulers of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar supported their fellow rulers in Muscat and Abu Dhabi over Buraimi, we were very much mistaken. On the contrary the Rulers despised Muscat and thought that Saud was right. They would warmly welcome an agreement which was acceptable to Saud even though it involved large concessions on the other side. I said that our advice from the Gulf was certainly not so categorical as this, to which he replied that he had told Sir B. Burrows all this, that the Ruler of Qatar had become almost hysterical on the subject when talking to Mr. George Brown, and that if I did not believe him I could ask Shaikh Abdullah Jabir. I protested that Shaikh Abdullah had little time left in England and in any case would be embarrassed by such direct conversation. Mr. Bustani replied by bringing the Shaikh into the conversation, who showed willingness and even pleasure at the prospect of talking to me about it tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. Walmsley

R
(D.M.H. Riches)
March 7, 1958

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
11 MAR 1958

Registry
No.

FA1081/5

Top Secret.
☒ Secret
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

letter to
Sir B. Burrows
KCMG
BAHRAIN

from

Mr. Riches

copies to:

KUWAIT

DOHA

DUBAI

MUSCAT

after having
been assumed
that ~~that~~ he
would not be
quoted in
Kuwait or
elsewhere,

Pl. Submit
to me a
copy of entry

10/3

RECEIVED IN DIVISION	
11 MAR 1958	
SENT TO BY	Mr. (6405)
DESPATCHED	Wt. 58875/319.

At a lunch given by the British Bank for

Shaikh Abdullah Jabir on March 7, Emile Bustani
~~represented to me~~
~~repeated~~ forcibly that if we imagined that the
Rulers and the ~~ruling~~ families of Kuwait,
Bahrain and Qatar supported their fellow rulers
in Muscat and Abu Dhabi over Buraimi we were
very much mistaken. On the contrary, the
Rulers despised the Sultan and thought that
Saud was right. They would warmly welcome an
agreement which was acceptable to Saud even
though it involved large concessions on the
other side. After exchanges arising out of
these statements Bustani appealed to the Shaikh
to confirm what he had said. The Shaikh
expressed agreement but as he was across the
table we ~~agreed~~ ^{arranged} to pursue the conversation ^{more}
privately the following day.

2. When we met on March 8 Shaikh Abdullah
Jabir expressed himself more or less in the
following terms.

3. All educated Arabs and many others - in
Kuwait as elsewhere - hated the British
because they had done things which they ought
not to have done (i.e. Israel and Suez). In
the past we had been able to ignore such a
situation but this was ~~now~~ no longer possible
and we ought to have regard for our interests
and make friends with those who could help us.
Such a person was King Saud: he was liked and
respected by all the Gulf shaikhs (i.e. of
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar) who did not fear
that he would expand at their expense. They
trusted him and thought the British too should
make friends with him.

4. Shaikh Abdullah went on to say that none of the Shaikhs liked Shakh^hbut or the Sultan. At Dammam in 1951 the former had behaved quite intolerably, laying down the law as if he was the equal of Saud and boasting that he had the British behind him. (I believe our version of this encounter is that the Saudis were intolerably rude to Shakh^hbut). As regards the Sultan, although racially Arab he did not behave like one but rather like a rajah. He had been educated in India and his whole attitude was Indian. He was notoriously parsimonious and notoriously inaccessible. An Arab Ruler should be open handed and his Majlis open to the humblest of his subjects. In any case what was Muscat? It was only the Sultan himself; he had no lieutenants, no officials who could speak for him.

5. As regards the basis for an agreement over Buraimi, the Shaikh ~~showed an awareness of~~ ^{knew about} the recent Bahrain/Saudi seabed agreement and thought that something similar could be achieved over Buraimi. Saud would certainly have to have Buraimi but it could be included in an area where Saud would give half the proceeds from the exploitation of oil to the other Rulers concerned.

6. In general the Shaikh showed an awareness of the fact that autocracy in Saudi Arabia and the Shaikhdoms stood or fell together and that the autocrats should therefore cooperate. He wanted to retain British protection and Saud's friendship and the way to do this was for Britain to reach ^{an} accommodation with Saud. He realized that we had obligations to support Abu

/Dhabi

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Dhabi and the Sultan but they were surely not obligations extended to the lengths we had gone to help these people. In any case we had had similar obligations to the Shaikh of Mohammerah yet our interests had been served by letting a million ^(six) Arabs in Khuzistan go under Iranian rule.

7. Bustani was present throughout this talk but hardly prompted ^{or appeared to have primed} the Shaikh at all except, I think, over the proposal for an oil-sharing zone. The Shaikh ~~did~~ ^{certainly}, however, produced off his own bat the statement that no settlement could ever be achieved over Buraimi which was not acceptable to King Saud.

8. Needless to say I argued with the Shaikh all the way ~~through~~ ^{along} but he was impervious to anything said to Saud's disadvantage. Saud would only expand in areas to which he had a right; if there had been bribery at Buraimi he was not aware of it; it was not so that Buraimi had not been Saudi for 100 years before 1952; even if the Sultan had nothing in the till he should still behave like an Arab ruler; ~~in view of Saud's delightful character he would not go further than his rights.~~ Britain should support Abu Dhabi and Muscat but not too much.

9. I have thought it worth while to set down the above as a first-hand account of what a sensible Shaikh from the Gulf ^{apparently} thinks. I realize that Shaikh Abdullah may have been excessively influenced by Bustani, that it is quite possible for a Shaikh to allow ^{hates temporarily to outweigh} personal considerations ^{of state}, and for him to take the easy and irresponsible way of advocating a course which he thinks is unlikely to be pursued. All the same I think he

/was

was sincere in thinking that we had not made sufficient effort to meet King Saud and I should imagine that this is a fairly general opinion ruling families in the in the northern shaikhdoms. Bustani told me that when he took Mr. George Brown M.P. to see Shaikh Ali, the latter became quite hysterical over Abu Dhabi and the Sultan. ^{Bustani} He did admit however that Shaikh Salman had been "cagey" and in fact the only one who did not come out solidly in favour of Saud. I may say that at one point Bustani volunteered to go to Abu Dhabi and Muscat (with the blessing of the British Govt.) to try and persuade them to be more reasonable. But a day later he withdrew this offer partly because he knew that the Sultan was very stubborn and partly because he did not think it would be in his own interests!

10. I am sending copies of this letter to Kuwait, Doha, Dubai and Muscat.

10/3

10. Incidentally we understand that Sheikh Abdullah Tubow's operation was entirely successful. He left on March 9 by rail for Paris whence he is going to spend a month or more in Switzerland.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN